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BAR BRIEFS

NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
Kreifels vs. Insurance Co.: A mutual insurance company, requiring a payment of a membership fee for each type of automobile insurance and a premium deposit, billed plaintiff for a deficit of $8.51
under his former policy and for the sum of $19.00 for a new policy.
After applying a credit, there was a balance of $5.51 due the company,
for which plaintiff issued his check. The application blanks carried
the provision that "default in payment of the check, When due and
presented for payment, shall immediately and automatically void the
policy issued hereon without notice of any kind to undersigned." The
check was returned, marked "unpaid for want of funds;" whereupon
the company notified plaintiff that the insurance had automatically
lapsed. The new insurance period was to start April 13. Plaintiff
sought recovery for a collision occurring Sept. 27 of the same year.
HELD: The indebtedness due from the company was not a new
premium deposit, and even if pro-rated against the new period would
not take the insurance to the date of the collision. Plaintiff having
failed to restore the premium deposit for the current six-months period,
there was no insurance. Error on the part of the bank, in case plaintiff had sufficient funds there, is immaterial so far as defendant is
concerned.
Equity Exchange vs. First National Bank: Plaintiff had on deposit in A. State Bank $815.61. It drew a check for $750.00 and
deposited same in F. National Bank .in the same town. A. State
Bank had cash that day in sum of $2,098.25. In the clearance transaction between the two banks that day, this $750.00 check was included,
and A. Bank gave F. Bank a Minneapolis draft for $3,394.77. At the
time A. Bank had sufficient deposit in the Minneapolis Bank to cover
the draft. A. Bank did not reopen for business the next day, the State
Examiner taking charge. F. Bank forwarded the draft immediately
to the Minneapolis Bank, but it was not honored, and a few days later
plaintiff's account at the F. Bank was debited with the item of $750.00.
No specific agreement had been made between plaintiff and defendant
as to the manner in which this item was to be handled, but the defendant had handled it in the manner usually adopted in the general course
of business in the town. Plaintiff had no pass book, but these books
contained this stipulated notice: "In receiving items for deposit or
collection this bank acts only as the depositor's collecting agent and
assumes no responsibility beyond the exercise of due care. All items
are credited subject to the final payment in cash or solvent credits."
HELD: Plaintiff is not bound by the usages and customs of trade or
business unless shown to have been known by him. The claim that the
check was for collection does not relieve defendant, as it was not necessary to send such check out of town. The check could have been
paid in money, and if so paid, the defendant would have been liable.
The use of the draft was for defendant's accommodation and convenience, and not for the plaintiff's. F. Bank "was not authorized tQ
accept anything in payment of the check but money and in accepting a
draft in place of the money, when the money was there for the payment of the check, the defendant bank became liable to the plaintiff
for the amount of the check." (See 55 N. D. 370, 55 N. D. 406, 58 N
D. 715.)

BAR BRIEFS

Olson vs. Swendiman: Plaintiff agreed to work for defendant, a
dentist, for the term of five years. In event plaintiff left such employment during the life of the contract he agreed not to engage in the
practice of dentistry in Grand Forks or East Grand Forks for a period
of two years, violation of this part of the agreement to render him
liable in the sum of $2,000. At the end of four years plaintiff quit
defendant's employ and opened up an office of his own. On suit for
balance due by plaintiff, defendant alleged the contract and demanded
the $2,000 stipulated damages. HELD: Sections 5928, 5929 and 5930,
Compiled Laws of 1913, are controlling. They make void any contract
restraining one from the exercise of a lawful profession, trade or business, except as therein provided. This particular contract comes under
the fifth subdivision set forth in U. S. vs. Addiston Co., 85 Fed. Rep.
271, in which Judge Taft voiced approval of covenants in partial
restraint of trade. Plaintiff was an assistant, servant or agent, and as
a contract by such assistant, servant or agent not to compete with his
master or employer after the expiration of the time of service was not
included in the exceptions specified in Sections 5928, 5929 and 5930,
such contract was void.
THE WORLD COURT AND THE SENATE
In view of the repeated endorsement of the World Court by the
American Bar Association, the party planks in the platforms of both
major parties this June in favor of the adherence of the United States
to the Court are of especial interest to lawyers. The three protocols,
signed by the United States by the authority of the President in 1929,
were favorably reported to the Senate by the Foreign Relations Committee on June 1, last, giving added timeliness to a study of the Court
question now. When ratified the protocols will complete the adherence of the United States to the Court.
In the opinion both of the administration and of a majority of
the Foreign Relations Committee members, and of a great number of
bar associations throughout the country-the South Dakota Bar Association endorsed "the adherence of the United States to the Permanent
Court of International Justice, with the protocols now before the Senate," at its annual meeting this past August-the pending protocols
fully meet the United States' reservations, including that on advisory

opinions.
Several leading senators on both sides of the aisle have indicated
their intention of trying to get the debates on the protocols started early
in the session. Unless the debates are begun in December or early in
January it may be difficult to reach the record vote before adjournment
on March 4. The leaders for the Court should have the support of

a considerable number of senators, support which is likely to depend
to a degree upon the vigor with which public interest is expressed to
the senators, through letters and resolutions, between now and the
opening of congress on December 5.
It is reasonable to ask all the senators to help bring about conclusive action this winter (regardless of what their own vote may be
on the actual question of ratification) upon this important question of
our international policy, which has already hung fire in the Senate for
six years in spite of party pledges as long ago as 1924.

